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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On this appeal we review the district court's order 
denying James Baker's petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed under 28 U.S.C. S 2254. Baker, who has been 
incarcerated since February 12, 1987, contends that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his 
rights under the Sixth Amendment and that his 
resentencing to a greatly enhanced sentence following his 
unsuccessful appeal of his convictions violated his right to 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and will affirm the 
denial of the writ for the reasons which follow. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
On March 19, 1987, a New Jersey grand jury indicted 
Baker together with co-defendant Stephen L. Garry for two 
sets of crimes committed on the evening of January 7, 
1987, in Elizabeth, New Jersey: the robbery and attempted 
abduction of Elizabeth Soto and the abduction, kidnaping, 
and aggravated sexual assault of M.B., a 15-year old girl. 
Together, these incidents constituted second degree robbery 
in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:15-1 (West 1995); 
attempted kidnaping in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann.S 2C:5-1 
(West 1995) and N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:13-1b (West 1995); 
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criminal restraint in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann.S 2C:13-2 
(West 1995); first degree kidnaping in violation of N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 2C:13-1b; and aggravated sexual assault in violation 
of N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:14-2a (West Supp. 1998). 
 
Baker and Garry committed the first crime at 
approximately 8:00 p.m. on January 7, 1987. At that time 
Baker, who was driving a stolen car, and Garry, his 
passenger, pulled up alongside Soto, who was leaving a 
store. Garry jumped out and chased Soto. A struggle then 
ensued after Soto unsuccessfully tried to run away. Garry 
dragged Soto into the middle of the road toward the car. 
She told Garry to take her purse, but he said, "no, we want 
you." Soto then began to hit and kick Garry and called for 
help, and, after a ten-minute struggle during which Garry 
took Soto's purse, Garry jumped back into the car, and he 
and Baker drove off. A witness saw the struggle and the 
police were called. They arrived minutes later and began a 
search for the car. 
 
Meanwhile, about a mile away, Garry and Baker pulled 
up along side 15-year-old M.B. sometime after 8:30 p.m. as 
she was walking home from a friend's house. One of the 
two men pulled M.B. into the backseat of the car and over 
the next two hours Garry raped her twice and Baker forced 
her to perform fellatio on him and attempted to rape her. 
They then released her onto the street, and she made her 
way home. Her mother took her to a police station and then 
to a hospital. Subsequently, the police arrested both men 
and the grand jury indicted them for the offenses we have 
described. 
 
The heart of this appeal lies in the fact that at the time 
of Baker's offenses, indictment, trial, and sentencing a new 
law was in effect which required a mandatory minimum 
term of incarceration of 25 years in this case. Under N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 2C:13-1c (West 1995) the sentencing range for 
first degree kidnaping until one month before Baker's 
offenses had been 15 to 30 years without any requirement 
for a mandatory period of parole ineligibility. 1979 N.J. 
Laws c. 178, S 23. However, on December 8, 1986, the 
Legislature amended this section by enacting 1986 N.J. 
Laws c. 172, S 2, to provide that a person found guilty of 
kidnaping a victim under 16 years of age against whom a 
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sexual assault under N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:14-2 or N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 2C:14-3a is committed, shall be sentenced to a term 
of between 25 years and life imprisonment with 25 years of 
parole ineligibility. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:13-1c(2)(a) (West 
1995). Inasmuch as M.B. was under 16 and Baker and 
Garry sexually assaulted her during the kidnaping, the law 
required their sentencing upon conviction to an 
imprisonment term of at least 25 years without parole. 
 
Nevertheless, the prosecution, unaware of the 
amendment to N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:13-1c, offered Garry a 
plea bargain under which he would receive an aggregate 
custodial sentence of no more than 30 years with 15 years 
of parole ineligibility, conditioned upon Garry pleading 
guilty and "testifying truthfully" against Baker. Garry 
accepted this offer and thus pleaded guilty. The trial court, 
also unaware of the amendment, sentenced Garry to an 
aggregate custodial term of 30 years with 15 years of parole 
ineligibility. 
 
The State offered Baker the same plea bargain: a 
maximum term of 30 years with 15 years of parole 
ineligibility. Baker declined this offer, however, and chose 
to go to trial because his attorney advised him that he had 
nothing to gain from accepting the plea: if he went to trial 
the maximum sentence he faced was 30 years with 15 
years of parole ineligibility -- the very same "deal" the State 
was offering. Baker's attorney, like the court and the 
prosecutor, was, of course, unaware of the change in the 
law. 
 
After a two-day trial, a jury on September 10, 1987, 
found Baker guilty of robbery, attempted kidnaping, 
kidnaping and aggravated sexual assault. The court 
dismissed the charge of criminal restraint. On December 4, 
1987, the court, unaware of the change in the law, 
sentenced Baker to concurrent nine-year terms of 
imprisonment with three-year terms of parole ineligibility 
for robbery and attempted kidnaping and a consecutive 18- 
year term of imprisonment with an eight-year term of parole 
ineligibility for kidnaping. The court merged Baker's 
conviction for aggravated sexual assault into his conviction 
for kidnaping. Thus, the court sentenced Baker to an 
aggregate custodial term of 27 years with 11 years of parole 
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ineligibility. Accordingly, both Baker and Garry received 
illegal sentences. 
 
Baker filed an untimely notice of appeal from his 
conviction on July 18, 1988, but the Appellate Division of 
the New Jersey Superior Court, entered an order on 
February 22, 1989, authorizing the appeal to befiled nunc 
pro tunc. Baker asserted various trial errors on appeal, but 
when he filed the appeal he still was unaware of the 
sentencing amendment on the kidnaping charge. However, 
on August 21, 1989, the State filed a motion for leave to file 
a cross-appeal nunc pro tunc, contending that Baker's 
sentence for kidnaping was illegal because of the change in 
law prior to the commission of the offenses.1 The Appellate 
Division granted that motion on September 12, 1989. Then, 
in an unpublished per curiam opinion filed on January 2, 
1990, the Appellate Division affirmed Baker's convictions 
and, inasmuch as it agreed with the State that Baker was 
subject to the 25-year parole disqualifier, it remanded the 
case to the trial court for reconsideration of the sentence. 
State v. Baker, No. A-5384-87T4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Jan. 2, 1990). 
 
Baker moved in the Appellate Division for reconsideration 
of the order remanding the case for reconsideration of his 
sentence, but the court denied his motion on February 27, 
1990, stating that the trial court could address the issues 
he raised in the motion when it reconsidered Baker's 
sentence. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied Baker's 
petition for certification on June 13, 1990. State v. Baker, 
584 A.2d 246 (N.J. 1990). 
 
Baker then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The State has not attempted to have the state court correct Garry's 
sentence because, as it explained at argument before us, if the court 
increased Garry's sentence, he would be entitled to have his guilty plea 
vacated and to go to trial. Thus, Garry's position differed from that of 
Baker who did go to trial. See State v. Baker, 636 A.2d 553, 565 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). The State was not willing to run the risk of 
another trial because by the time it discovered the error considerable 
time had elapsed from the time of the offenses. Moreover, it did not wish 
to require the victims to face the trauma of a second trial. Garry, of 
course, has not challenged his illegal sentence. 
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trial court on March 27, 1991, alleging that he had been 
denied effective assistance of counsel and that he had been 
denied due process and equal protection of the law because 
the State had entered into a plea bargain with Garry under 
which Garry testified against Baker in exchange for an 
illegally short sentence. After an evidentiary hearing, the 
trial court denied his petition on October 7, 1991. 
 
On February 19, 1992, the trial court resentenced Baker 
to a 25-year term of imprisonment without eligibility for 
parole for kidnaping and concurrent nine-year terms of 
imprisonment with three-year periods of parole ineligibility 
for robbery and attempted kidnaping. The court merged 
Baker's conviction for aggravated sexual assault into his 
conviction for kidnaping. Thus, the court resentenced 
Baker to an aggregate custodial term of 25 years without 
eligibility for parole, more than doubling the period of 
parole ineligibility it had imposed in the original sentence. 
 
Baker filed separate notices of appeal from the denial of 
his petition for post-conviction relief and from the judgment 
entered on his resentencing. The Appellate Division 
consolidated these appeals on December 30, 1992, and 
affirmed Baker's convictions on January 21, 1994, over a 
dissent. State v. Baker, 636 A.2d 553 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1994). On further appeal, the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey, on October 27, 1994, affirmed the decision of the 
Appellate Division with one justice dissenting. State v. 
Baker, 648 A.2d 1127 (N.J. 1994). 
 
Baker filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on April 
23, 1996, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254 in the district court 
but the court denied the petition in an order entered 
September 24, 1997. Baker then appealed.2  As the district 
court relied entirely on the state court record and did not 
hold an evidentiary hearing, we exercise plenary review of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note that the appellees did not argue in the district court that any 
of Baker's claims were not exhausted in the state courts and the district 
court rejected them on the merits. We are satisfied from our examination 
that Baker's claims have been exhausted. Inasmuch as Baker filed his 
petition before the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, the provisions of that statute are not applicable here. See 
United States v. Skandier, 125 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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the habeas proceeding. 28 U.S.C. S 2254; see, e.g., 
Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 291 n.5 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Denial of Effective Assistance of Counsel  
 
Baker argues that he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment because of his 
attorney's ignorance of the statutory sentencing 
amendment during the plea negotiations and because his 
attorney made various errors during the trial. Baker 
contends that his attorney's ignorance of the sentencing 
law caused him to pass up the opportunity to plead guilty 
and to be sentenced to a 30-year term with a 15-year limit 
of parole ineligibility.3 Inasmuch as we find that his 
contentions with respect to his representation at trial are 
clearly without merit, we confine our discussion to the 
significance of his attorney's ignorance of the sentencing 
law. 
 
We start our discussion of the Sixth Amendment issues 
by pointing out that a defendant's right to effective counsel 
includes the period of his representation during a plea 
process as well as during a trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 (1985). Accordingly, we judge 
this unusual case by applying the ordinary standards for 
granting relief when a defendant claims that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, to prevail on his 
claim Baker must satisfy a two-prong test. First, he must 
show that his attorney's performance was "deficient," that 
is, "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant 
by the Sixth Amendment . . . ." Strickland v. Washington, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In his brief, Baker contended that he is entitled to be sentenced to a 
27-year term with an 11-year period of parole ineligibility. This request 
for relief obviously is dependent upon the reimposition of the sentence 
the trial court imposed following his conviction at trial and thus is not 
consistent with his theory that he never should have stood trial. At oral 
argument, his attorney conceded that his claim should be for the 
imposition of a 30-year sentence with a 15-year period of parole 
ineligibility. 
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466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Next, he 
must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2068. Of course, inasmuch as Baker's contentions 
regarding trial error are meritless, a different result can 
mean only that in the absence of his attorney's ignorance of 
the amendment of the sentencing law, Baker would have 
pleaded guilty and the court would have sentenced him to 
a shorter sentence than that it ultimately imposed. 
 
We agree with Baker that his trial attorney's error with 
respect to his ignorance of the sentencing law has satisfied 
the first prong of the Strickland test. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
688, 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. While we realize that this 
case is extraordinary in that the state trial judge 4 and the 
prosecutor also did not know of the change in the law even 
at the time of Baker's sentencing almost one year after the 
enactment of the amendment, still we must hold that an 
attorney who does not know the basic sentence for an 
offense at the time that his client is contemplating entering 
a plea is ineffective.5 
 
Baker, however, has not met the second Strickland prong 
-- a showing that there is a "reasonable probability that, 
but for" the error there might have been a different result. 
The "reasonable probability" test is not a stringent one. See 
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175, 106 S.Ct. 988, 998 
(1986) (reasonable probability standard less demanding 
than preponderance standard). We have recognized that "[a] 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v. 
Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Strickland, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In fact three different Superior Court judges were unaware of the 
change in the law, the judge who accepted Garry's plea of guilty, the 
judge who sentenced Garry, and the judge who sentenced Baker. 
 
5. Our opinion must not be overread. We recognize that the ascertaining 
of a sentence for an offense can be a difficult matter, particularly in 
the 
federal courts where sentence calculations can be quite complex and can 
depend on facts not ascertained when the defendant pleads to the 
offense. Here, however, the sentence required for the offense was 
straightforward as counsel had only to examine the latest statutory 
amendments to determine it. 
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466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068). But Baker's arguments 
as to prejudice are totally speculative and do not meet that 
standard. 
 
We have held that an attorney can be ineffective by giving 
a defendant false information about sentencing, thereby 
inducing the defendant to plead guilty instead of going to 
trial. See Meyers v. Gillis, 142 F.3d 664 (3d Cir. 1998). In 
Meyers we found that a defense attorney was mistaken in 
informing his client that he would be eligible for parole in 
a case where the offense to which the defendant pled guilty 
carried a mandatory life sentence. We reasoned that there 
was prejudice because there was evidence that, but for the 
attorney's advice, the defendant would not have pled guilty, 
and might have been convicted of a lesser offense. Id. at 
664. Similarly, there can be no doubt that an attorney can 
be ineffective in giving his client advice which leads him to 
turn down a favorable plea agreement if the attorney is not 
aware of the applicable basic sentencing law. Here, 
however, Baker has not shown that if his attorney had been 
aware of the sentencing law he might have obtained a 
sentence of 30 years with a 15-year term of parole 
ineligibility by pleading guilty or, indeed, obtained a 
sentence for any period less than that the court ultimately 
imposed. 
 
If Baker's attorney had known of the sentencing 
amendment he would have had the professional duty to 
alert the State and the court of the amendment because a 
defendant cannot bargain for an illegal sentence. See, e.g., 
In re Norton, 608 A.2d 328, 338 (N.J. 1992); State v. 
Nemeth, 519 A.2d 367, 368 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) 
("[T]here can be no plea bargain to an illegal sentence."); 
see also N.J. Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(3) ("A 
lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal 
legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the 
lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client 
and not disclosed by opposing counsel."); 3.3(a)(5) ("A 
lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal a 
material fact with the knowledge that the tribunal may tend 
to be misled by such failure."). Therefore, if Baker's 
attorney had known of the correct sentence for the 
kidnaping, and thus had been an effective counsel, Baker 
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could not have accepted the plea offer as it required him to 
plead guilty to first degree kidnaping in circumstances in 
which the applicable statute required a sentence with a 25- 
year mandatory period of parole ineligibility. 
 
It therefore follows that, if his attorney had not been 
ineffective, Baker could have obtained a 30-year sentence 
with a 15-year period of parole ineligibility only if his 
attorney could have negotiated for a dismissal of the 
kidnaping count. But it is mere speculation to think that he 
could have done so. After all, Baker cannot demonstrate 
that there was a reasonable probability that the prosecutor 
would have negotiated a plea agreement that would 
frustrate the Legislature's then recently adopted 
requirement for a 25-year period of parole ineligibility in the 
circumstances of this case. Furthermore, even if Baker 
could have negotiated the agreement with the prosecutor, it 
could have been implemented only with the consent of the 
trial court because New Jersey state court practice permits 
the trial court to reject a guilty plea even when tendered 
pursuant to a plea agreement. See N.J. Ct. R. 3:9-2; 3:9-3. 
While we never can know whether the trial court would 
have accepted the hypothetical plea agreement, the 
Appellate Division on Baker's second appeal indicated that 
it was unwilling to "frustrate [the] legislative directive" for a 
25-year period of parole ineligibility. Thus, for that reason, 
among others, it upheld the resentencing. Baker cannot 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that a 
trial court's attitude would have been any different. State v. 
Baker, 636 A.2d at 564. 
 
In considering whether there was a reasonable 
probability that Baker would have been able to negotiate for 
a dismissal of the kidnaping charge, it is important to 
recognize how severe the prosecutor's bargaining position 
had been. During the negotiations the parties believed that 
the proposed plea agreement which included a 30-year 
term with a 15-year period of parole ineligibility was the 
maximum sentence for the kidnaping offense. See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 2C:13-1c; N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:43-6b (West 1995). 
Indeed, while it was possible that by reason of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences on separate counts 
that upon Baker's conviction the court could have imposed 
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a longer custodial term, see State v. Baker, 636 A.2d at 
561, the proposed sentence was so long that Baker's 
attorney advised him that he had nothing to lose by going 
to trial. 
 
Moreover, the court upon Baker's conviction sentenced 
him to a 27-year term with an 11-year period of parole 
ineligibility, in a sense vindicating Baker's attorney's 
position which, in the absence of the sentencing 
amendment, would have been unassailable. It is, of course, 
unusual for a court to sentence a defendant upon his 
conviction at trial to a shorter sentence than that offered 
prior to trial6 and the court's action plainly demonstrates 
that the prosecutor in his sentencing offer was not being 
lenient with Baker. In view of this attitude, Baker cannot 
demonstrate that if the prosecutor had known of the 25- 
year mandatory period of parole ineligibility, he would have 
been willing to enter into a plea agreement which included 
a dismissal of the kidnaping charge. Plainly, the reasonable 
inference we draw from the objective evidence is exactly to 
the contrary. Thus, Baker cannot demonstrate that there is 
a reasonable probability that his attorney's error had any 
effect on the outcome of the case. 
 
We recognize that the district court did not conduct an 
evidentiary hearing in this case and that sometimes it is 
necessary for the court to hold such a hearing to resolve 
disputed questions of fact. But this case does not fall 
within that category as the nature of Baker's claim is such 
that his chances for relief must remain nothing more than 
a possibility. Consequently, we will not remand so that the 
district court can preside over a charade in which witnesses 
testify about hypothetical conduct. In these circumstances, 
we cannot hold that there is a reasonable probability that 
but for his attorney's error, the result of this case could 
have been different.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. This sentencing approach is well known to all attorneys practicing 
criminal law and is nothing new. See Comment, The Influence of the 
Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 Yale L.J. 204 
(1956). 
 
7. We note that the dissent suggests that on a remand the district court 
could inquire into whether the attorney who, on Baker's behalf, filed his 
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Some context as to the trial testimony is helpful in 
explaining our decision. The first victim, Soto, tentatively 
identified Baker as the driver of the car which pulled up 
beside her and she positively identified Baker at trial. The 
second victim, M.B., testified that Baker attempted to 
sexually assault her but that she bit him and that this 
deterred his attack. While M.B. immediately after the crime 
did not identify Baker from a photo array, she was able to 
do so a few weeks later and she identified him at trial. 
Garry testified for the State that he and Baker committed 
both crimes, but he testified that he, not Baker, drove the 
car, and that it was Baker who jumped out to grab Soto 
and, later that evening, M.B.8 He also testified that both he 
and Baker sexually assaulted M.B. in the car. Further, 
Detective Conrad Cheatham of the Elizabeth Police 
Department, who arrested Baker, testified that Baker 
admitted participating in the assault upon Soto, stating 
that Garry drove the car while he attacked Soto. State v. 
Baker, 636 A.2d at 558. Given the strength of this evidence, 
there is no reasonable probability that in order to 
accommodate Baker the State would have dropped thefirst- 
degree kidnaping charge if it had been aware of the 25-year 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
first appeal, was ineffective because he apparently did not advise Baker 
that he faced a longer sentence by appealing. This appellate attorney, 
who was an Assistant Deputy Public Defender, had not represented 
Baker in the plea negotiations and at the trial. The problem with this 
suggestion, quite aside from any ethical considerations that might have 
compelled the attorney to share his knowledge of the sentencing error 
with the state, if he had any such knowledge, is that Baker never has 
raised this issue in either the state or federal courts. For example, in 
this court he contends in his brief that his constitutional rights "were 
violated because he received ineffective counsel during the plea 
negotiations of his case," "trial counsel was ineffective because he 
failed 
to make sufficient efforts to research the applicable sentencing law," and 
his "Sixth Amendment rights were violated because the cumulative effect 
of counsel's errors denied him effective assistance of counsel." His brief 
makes plain that his reference to the cumulative errors means error at 
trial. 
 
8. Of course, if the State had been aware of the mandatory sentence, it 
could not have made the plea agreement it did make with Garry and 
perhaps his testimony would not have been available in Baker's case. 
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mandatory imprisonment term without parole eligibility or 
that the court would have approved any such action. 
 
Of course, we cannot replay the events of the pre-trial 
proceedings. Yet it is clear enough that the Strickland test 
requires a showing that a defendant has been deprived of 
a "just result" due to ineffective counsel. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. The State's cross-appeal to 
correct the sentence provided Baker with what he would 
have had if he had received effective representation during 
the plea stage, the right to be sentenced legally. His 
attorney's mistake in no way affected the constitutionality 
of the subsequent trial. The mistake deprived Baker only of 
the possibility to negotiate for the dismissal of the 
kidnaping charge, but as we have indicated, he cannot 
show that he was prejudiced by the loss of this speculative 
opportunity. Thus, his Sixth Amendment claim must fail. 
 
B. Fundamental Unfairness 
 
Baker argues that his resentencing to the 25-year term of 
imprisonment without eligibility for parole mandated by 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:13-1c(2)(a) violated his right to due 
process of law. Due process of law comprehends concepts 
less rigid and more fluid than those provided in specific and 
particular constitutional guarantees. To show a due process 
violation, Baker must show that his resentencing was 
"fundamentally unfair," Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 
1208, 1221 (3d Cir. 1987), or was "shocking to the 
universal sense of justice." Kinsella v. United States ex rel. 
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246, 80 S.Ct. 297, 304 (1960). 
Baker claims that the parties' and the court's ignorance of 
the sentencing amendment for kidnaping led to his serving 
a portion of his sentence before any challenge was made, 
and that it is unfair that he now should face a longer 
sentence without parole than he had expected. Of course, 
Baker's due process argument includes the odd fact that he 
is claiming a right to illegal treatment. 
 
On the fundamental fairness issue we first consider 
double jeopardy principles for while they are conceptually 
distinct from due process principles still to a degree they 
are informative even here. In Bozza v. United States, 330 
U.S. 160, 67 S.Ct. 645 (1947), the trial court inadvertently 
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failed to impose a statutorily mandated fine in sentencing 
the defendant, but recalled him to impose the omitted fine. 
Rejecting his contention that this resentencing constituted 
a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court stated: 
 
       This Court has rejected the `doctrine that a prisoner, 
       whose guilt is established, by a regular verdict, is to 
       escape punishment altogether, because the court 
       committed an error in passing the sentence.' The 
       Constitution does not require that sentencing should 
       be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means 
       immunity for the prisoner. In this case the court`only 
       set aside what it had no authority to do and 
       substitute[d] directions required by the law to be done 
       upon the conviction of the offender.' It did not twice 
       put petitioner in jeopardy for the same offense. The 
       sentence, as corrected, imposes a valid punishment for 
       an offense instead of an invalid punishment for that 
       offense. 
 
Id. at 166-67, 67 S.Ct. at 649 (citations omitted). 
 
Following Bozza, we have stated that a guilty prisoner 
cannot "escape punishment because the court committed 
an error in passing sentence." United States v. Busic, 639 
F.2d 940, 946 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Bozza, 330 U.S. at 166, 
67 S.Ct. at 648). See also id. at 948 ("Nothing in the history 
or policy of the [Double Jeopardy] clause suggests that its 
purposes included protecting the finality of a sentence and 
thereby barring resentencing to correct a sentence entered 
illegally or erroneously."). This principle is true even in 
cases like Baker's where the prisoner already has begun to 
serve his sentence. Busic, 639 F.2d at 948 n.11. 
 
Baker nevertheless contends that it is a violation of the 
Due Process Clause to correct even an illegal sentence 
when enough time has passed such that the prisoner has 
some real interest in expecting a certain release date or in 
fact has been released and faces reincarceration. See 
Hawkins v. Freeman, 166 F.3d 267, 273-75 (4th Cir. 1999); 
DeWitt v. Venetoulo, 6 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 1993); Breest v. 
Helgemoe, 579 F.2d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 1978). In Breest, the 
court noted that the power of a sentencing court to correct 
an invalid sentence "must be subject to some temporal 
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limit." Breest, 579 F.2d at 101. According to the court, "[a]s 
the months and years pass," the expected release date 
acquires "a real and psychologically critical importance" to 
the inmate. Id. After a "substantial period of time" passes, 
"it might be fundamentally unfair . . . to alter even an 
illegal sentence in a way which frustrates a prisoner's 
expectations [of release]." Id. 
 
Baker's reasonable expectations could not have reached 
that "temporal limit" wherever it may be. Baker's reliance 
on his sentence could not have lasted even two years as he 
was sentenced on December 4, 1987, and the State moved 
on August 21, 1989, for leave to cross-appeal from the 
sentence. Further, he could not have had a clear 
"expectation of finality" when the State cross-appealed as 
the direct appeal process had not been concluded by that 
time. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136, 
101 S. Ct. 426, 437 (1980) (defendant "has no expectation 
of finality in his sentence until the appeal is concluded or 
the time to appeal has expired"); State v. Rodriguez, 478 
A.2d 408, 412 (N.J. 1984) ("Since the underlying 
substantive convictions in this case were themselves the 
subject of attack on an appeal in which defendant sought 
their modification, no legitimate expectation offinality could 
be invested in the underlying convictions or the sentences 
related to them."). 
 
We realize that prisoners place enormous weight upon 
their hopes for parole or release. But Baker has not shown 
a substantial enough expectation of release to support a 
finding of a violation of his due process rights. While Baker 
relies heavily on DeWitt v. Venetoulo that case is 
distinguishable as there, after a defendant was paroled, the 
court reimposed a sentence to correct an illegal order 
suspending a portion of his sentence. 
 
It is also significant that Baker initiated the appellate 
process and was seeking a new trial by appealing. Thus, as 
the Appellate Division indicated on Baker's second appeal, 
his "own appeal prevented his convictions and sentences 
from being invested with finality." State v. Baker, 636 A.2d 
at 564. Therefore, it is conceivable that if he had been 
successful on appeal and then had been convicted at a new 
trial, the court might have imposed a greater sentence on 
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him than that it originally imposed. Id. While it is true that 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 812, 89 S.Ct. 2072 
(1969), places some limitations on the enhancement of a 
sentence after a retrial, the case is not an absolute bar to 
such an enhancement. Thus, by appealing, Baker gambled 
that he would lose the advantage of the 27-year sentence 
with an 11-year period of parole ineligibility. He lost his 
gamble, though not in a way he could have anticipated 
when he appealed. 
 
We ultimately are persuaded by the State's argument 
that it is proper that Baker serve at least the minimum 
sentence the Legislature intended for the crimes he 
committed. One month before Baker kidnaped and sexually 
assaulted the minor girl, the Legislature directed that any 
person who commits such an offense should serve at least 
a 25-year term of imprisonment without parole. We would 
thwart this legislative directive if we were to conclude that 
due process considerations require that Baker be allowed to 
avoid the statutorily required minimum sentence because 
the trial court failed to impose the mandated period of 
parole ineligibility, and the State failed to appeal the 
sentence for more than a year-and-a-half. 
 
The State had the right to pursue an appeal of the illegal 
sentence, and Baker now is serving the sentence mandated 
for the crimes he has committed. The only possible relief 
that Baker could obtain from either this court or the 
district court on remand after further proceedings is that 
he be released unless the state court resentences him to an 
illegal sentence. See Orban v. Vaughn, 123 F.3d 727, 731 
n.1 (3d Cir. 1997). Surely, only the most compelling 
circumstances could justify a federal court to grant the 
extraordinary relief of requiring a state court to impose an 
illegal sentence as a condition of holding a prisoner in 
custody. Those circumstances are not present here. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
We close with the following overview of this case. Baker 
was constitutionally convicted and sentenced to the 
minimum term for his offenses. In these circumstances, it 
is quite remarkable that he petitions for a writ of habeas 
 
                                16 
  
corpus so that he can obtain an illegal result. We will not 
grant him such relief. 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order of 
September 24, 1997. 
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POLLAK, District Judge, dissenting: 
 
I. 
 
As the court's opinion makes plain, one who, pursuant to 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), mounts a 
challenge to a conviction and/or sentence on the ground of 
asserted ineffective assistance of counsel, must, in order to 
prevail, show that (1) "counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment," id. at 687, and (2) 
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Id. at 694. 
 
I agree with the court's persuasive demonstration that 
Baker's "trial attorney's error with respect to his ignorance 
of the sentencing law has satisfied the first prong of the 
Strickland test." However, given the procedural posture of 
this habeas corpus proceeding--in which we, as an 
appellate panel, are reviewing a district court denial of the 
writ based on pleadings and legal argument, no evidentiary 
record having been made in the district court--I do not feel 
that I can with entire confidence subscribe to the court's 
conclusion that Baker "has not met the second Strickland 
prong--a showing that there is a `reasonable probability 
that, but for' the error, there might have been a different 
result." The court's opinion argues with considerable force 
the proposition that, even if Baker's trial attorney had in 
1987 been properly informed about the 1986 amendment of 
the statute governing sentence and had communicated that 
information to Baker, his client, the sentence ultimately 
imposed on Baker would not have been less severe than the 
sentence he now challenges. Very possibly so. But the 
court's argument, while long on advocacy, is somewhat 
short on factual infrastructure--and this is unsurprising, 
given that (1) no evidentiary record was made in the district 
court and (2) it does not appear that any of the several 
proceedings in the state courts focused systematically in 
some factually comprehensive fashion on the sentencing 
aspect of Baker's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
Accordingly, the appropriate course for this court to pursue 
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is, so it seems to me, the conventional course of remand for 
development of the facts. 
 
The court eschews this course. The court states that "we 
will not remand so that the district court can preside over 
a charade in which witnesses testify about hypothetical 
conduct." But characterizing the proposed district court 
inquiry as one which would address "hypothetical conduct" 
does not mean that no inquiry is called for. Any inquiry 
into whether an acknowledged error--in this instance, the 
ineffectiveness of counsel--was harmless or not necessarily 
calls for an assessment of the likelihood that a road not 
taken might have brought the traveler to a destination 
other the than one actually arrived at. Characterizing such 
an inquiry as "hypothetical" may signify that it could be 
instructively pursued in a law school classroom, but it does 
not serve to remove it from the courtroom. And so, 
persuaded that this habeas corpus case should be 
remanded for further proceedings, I respectfully dissent.1 
 
II. 
 
If this case were to be remanded for further proceedings 
in the district court, I would think it proper that such 
further proceedings also encompass some inquiry into a 
facet of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issue which 
has not been addressed by the parties in briefing and 
arguing this appeal. I have in mind the question whether 
Baker was adequately advised by counsel who represented 
Baker in 1988, when, rather tardily, he undertook tofile an 
appeal from his 1987 conviction. So far as I can determine 
from the materials available to us on appeal, it appears 
likely that appellate counsel, at the time Baker's appeal was 
perfected, was, like trial counsel a year before, unaware of 
the 1986 amendment of the sentencing statute. If that is 
the case, we have a second instance of ineffective- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Notwithstanding my disagreement with the court on this Strickland 
issue, I would note that I entirely agree with the court -- for the 
reasons 
given in the court's opinion -- that the action of the New Jersey courts 
in extending Baker's unauthorized sentence to a term in conformity with 
the strictures of the 1986 amendment of the sentencing statute did not 
work a denial of Baker's substantive due process rights. 
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 assistance-of-counsel--one that would appear to be even 
more egregious than the first, since an additional year had 
gone by since the Legislature changed the governing law. 
And this putative second instance of ineffective-assistance- 
of-counsel may very well have been the factor which 
propelled Baker, through appellate counsel, to pursue what 
proved to be the calamitous course of filing an appeal-- 
"calamitous" in that Baker's appeal set the stage for the 
state's cross-appeal, leading to the longer sentence which 
Baker has challenged in this habeas corpus proceeding. 
Properly advised of the dramatically enhanced parole 
ineligibility he might face were he to succeed on appeal and 
thereby gain a new trial, and, potentially, a second 
conviction, Baker might well have foregone filing the 1988 
direct appeal of his 1987 conviction. On the other hand it 
is indeed possible that, even if Baker had been properly 
advised of the large risk an appeal entailed, he would 
nonetheless have directed counsel to appeal. Which would 
have been the more likely scenario we cannot tell. But in 
order fully to assess whether Baker has a valid Strickland 
claim with respect to his appeal, inquiry is called for. And 
that inquiry would be the province of the district court, 
unless that court were to determine that the question of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is unexhausted 
and hence not open to current scrutiny on Baker's present 
application for habeas corpus. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons given in Part I of this opinion, I dissent 
from the judgment of the court. Were this case remanded to 
the district court for the further proceedings contemplated 
in Part I, those further proceedings should, in my 
judgment, also entail inquiry into the issue identified in 
Part II. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                20 
 
